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BOYS MARKETS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN THE
SYMPATHY STRIKE CONTEXT: BUFFALO FORGE
FROM A MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
On the final day of its 1975-76 term, the United States
Supreme Court struck a devastating blow to the delicate labor
relations balance it had previously achieved in Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770.' The Court made it clear in
that case that where an employer agreed to arbitrate industrial
disputes in exchange for a union's pledge both to participate
in the arbitration and to refrain from striking over those dis-
putes, that agreement will be strictly enforced. Hence, if a
union chose to strike rather than arbitrate, that strike could be
enjoined. More simply put, the court would enforce the bargain
struck between the employer and the union.
In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America2
the Court destroyed this symmetry of obligation by holding
that the existence of a mandatory arbitration procedure and a
no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement did not
preclude a union and its members from honoring another
union's lawful picket line. In affirming the denial of a prelimi-
nary injunction, a majority of the Court, through Justice
White, held that its earlier Boys Markets decision did not
apply in this sympathy strike context because the dispute was
not over a grievance which both parties were bound to arbi-
trate, but instead was simply a manifestation of the striking
workers' deference to other employees' picket lines. The Boys
Markets balance is disturbed because notwithstanding the
union's express agreement to refrain from striking, sympathy
strike activity cannot be enjoined and unions are free to con-
tinue striking. Thus, even though the union may freely disre-
gard its express no-strike pledge, the employer is still bound to
arbitrate the permissibility of the sympathy action under the
agreement.
This comment examines the Buffalo Forge decision in an
attempt to demonstrate that its result is unwarranted. In doing
so, the author traces the theoretical underpinnings of the Boys
Markets decision and the federal circuit courts' conflict in deal-
1. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
2. 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
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ing with that decision in the sympathy strike context. In addi-
tion, the author also points out some of the practical difficulties
Buffalo Forge has created for employers and how that holding
exacerbates an already existing strain on labor-management
relations.
THE Boys MARKETS BALANCE
Because of the divergent interests of management and
labor, federal labor relations law and policy has developed as
a series of compromises. The Boys Markets decision evidences
one such compromise. On one side is the strong preference for
peaceful resolution of industrial disputes through the process
of arbitration. 3 Juxtaposed to this preference is the Norris La-
Guardia Act's clear enunciation that injunctions in the labor
context are generally forbidden.' Hence, without an injunction,
there is no effective enforcement mechanism for an employer
whose union chooses to strike rather than abide by its contrac-
tual obligation to arbitrate.' Here lies the tension. Public pol-
icy favors private dispute settlement through arbitration.
Practically speaking, however, public policy inhibits the vital-
ity of arbitration because it also denies a vehicle of enforcement
which will guarantee adherence to such agreements.
3. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), was the first of a series
of cases in which the Court sought to fashion a federal substantive labor law. There
the Court found a congressional policy favoring arbitration embodied in section 8 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1970) (see note 4 infra) and in section
301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970) (see note
10 infra). 353 U.S. at 455, 458. This case was the keystone for opening up the field of
labor arbitration. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 26 (3d ed.
1973) [hereinafter cited as ELKOURI & ELKOURI].
4. Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complain-
ant who has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law which
is involved in the labor dispute in question, or who has failed to make
every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with
the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or volun-
tary arbitration.
29 U.S.C. § 108 (1970).
5. Many states have 'arbitration statutes which provide for the enforcement of
arbitration agreements. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE, §§ 1280-88.8 (West 1972).
However, such remedies are of course less effective for an employer in the midst of a
strike because the enforcement of the arbitration agreement does not put an end to
the strike.
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Arbitration
Beginning with the Steelworkers Trilogy,' the Supreme
Court has repeatedly viewed arbitration as "a kingpin of fed-
eral labor policy,"7 and the preferred mechanism for resolving
disputes under collective bargaining agreements. That conclu-
sion is in accord with congressional intentions expressed in the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). s
To insure maximum utilization of the arbitration process,
the Supreme Court, in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co.,' held that when a party seeks to compel arbi-
tration in a dispute under section 301 of the LMRA,10 courts
6. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S" 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Corp., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). These cases are referred to
as the Steelworkers Trilogy because they all involved the same plaintiff, were decided
on the same day, and involved the issue of federal courts and arbitration. These cases
established several principles to be applied to cases involving enforcement of promises
to arbitrate. The courts must compel arbitration where the party seeking it makes a
claim which on its face is governed by the contract. Doubts over arbitrability should
be resolved in the affirmative. The question of interpretation of the agreement is for
the arbitrator. However, an award may be upheld only so long as it draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement. The courts should not reject an award unless
it is clear that the arbitrator has exceeded his authority. Courts also should not decide
the merits of the case. The merits are not subject to court inquiry in actions either to
compel arbitration or to enforce arbitration awards. The Supreme Court also rejected
the common law rule that a court action to enforce the award must be dismissed in
its entirety if any deficiency exists in the award. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 3, at
29.
7. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 226 (1962) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See Gateway Coal v. United Mineworkers, 414 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1974). In
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962), the Court stated that
the national policy was "to promote the arbitral process as a substitute for economic
warfare."
8. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970). Section 203(d) of the LMRA declares:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective
bargaining agreement.
In Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, Local 6222, 454 F.2d 1333,
1336 (5th Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit noted that "[s]ince [the] Lincoln Mills
[case], it has become increasingly clear that arbitration is the central institution for
the administration of the collective bargaining contract."
9. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
10. Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the par-
ties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
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should resolve questions of interpretation of the arbitration
clause by applying a strong presumption in favor of arbitrabil-
ity. By making the presumption difficult to rebut," the Court
insured that in virtually every case in which one party sought
arbitration, the dispute would be settled by an arbitrator."
Injunctions
After the Steelworkers Trilogy, questions inevitably arose
regarding which remedies an employer could obtain if a union
went on strike rather than adhering to its agreement to arbi-
trate a particular dispute. While it was clear that an employer
could bring a suit for damages, the damage award could not
repair the harm done by a strike.'3
However, if courts awarded injunctive relief, a severe con-
flict with another major element of federal labor relations pol-
icy would be created. By its enactment of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in 1932, Congress stripped federal courts of
their jurisdiction to issue injunctions in the labor-management
context except in very limited circumstances.'" This policy
In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957), the Court found that
section 301(a) was more than jurisdictional in nature. It relied heavily on legislative
history indicating a congressional intent that the statute be used to enforce agreements
to arbitrate. See id. at 451-55.
11. The Court ruled that a court may not declare an issue nonarbitrable "unless
it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of
an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor
of coverage." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-
83 (1960).
Similarly, courts have repeatedly indicated that the grievance and arbitration
provisions are to be viewed expansively. In Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.
Communications Workers, 454 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1971), for example, the district court
had denied injunctive relief under Boys Markets on the basis that the dispute in
question was not one in which the parties were bound to arbitrate. In vacating this
denial of injunctive relief, the Fifth Circuit held that in determining whether a dispute
is arbitrable, a court is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration
is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract and which is "arguably
arbitrable." Id. at 1336.
12. The presumption in favor of arbitration applies even to the interpretation of
the contract provisions going to the scope of arbitrable authority, such as those provid-
ing for specific exclusions of the general arbitration provision. United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1960).
After Warrior & Gulf most courts required a very strong showing that a dispute
came within a specific exclusion. See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble Indep. Union v. Proctor
& Gamble Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 644, 645-46 (2d Cir. 1962) (arbitration will be required
unless collective bargaining agreement contains "clear and unambiguous clause of
exclusion").
13. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970).
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970). Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides
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originated as a congressional response to federal court abuse of
its injunctive power to stifle union organization.'5 Moreover, in
1962, the Supreme Court expressly stated that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act prohibited the issuance of injunctions against
strikes over arbitrable grievances.' 6
The Balance
In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,' 7 how-
ever, the Court directly overruled its previous holding and held
that the Norris-LaGuardia's policy of prohibiting the issuance
of injunctions in the labor context had to accomodate the con-
flicting Steelworkers Trilogy policy favoring arbitral resolution
of industrial disputes. To do so, the Court created a "narrow
exception" to the Norris-LaGuardia prohibitions and gave
federal courts jurisdiction to issue injunctions to restrain
strikes over arbitrable grievances. Thus, if a union struck in
violation of its no-strike clause and its collective bargaining
contract committed that issue to resolution through an arbitra-
tion procedure, then that strike could be enjoined.' 8
The policy of promoting peaceful resolution of disputes
through arbitration was repeatedly emphasized in Boys
Markets.' Under Boys Markets, the sine qua non for injunctive
relief was the existence of a strike caused by a dispute subject
to resolution under the grievance arbitration procedures estab-
lished in the collective bargaining agreement. According to the
Court, issuing an injunction and ordering arbitration would
work no injustice, since both the employer and the union would
have their claims determined by the tribunal which the parties
had agreed was most competent and appropriate to interpret
the provisions of their collective bargaining agreement." In
in part: "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute . . ." Id. § 104. Section 7 provides that federal courts may enjoin
"unlawful" activities in the context of labor disputes, but only after the employer
makes certain specified showings and under strict procedural limitations. See id. § 107.
15. See Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the Judges: The Boys Markets
Case, 1970 Sup. CT. REv. 215, 236; Wimberly, The Labor Injunction-Past, Present and
Future, 22 S.C.L. REv. 689 (1970).
16. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 203 (1962).
17. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
18. Id. at 253-54.
19. "Indeed, the very purpose of arbitration procedures is to provide a mecha-
nism for the expeditious settlement of industrial disputes without resort to strikes,
lockouts, or other self help measures." Id. at 249.
20. Id. at 253 n.22.
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support of this notion, the Court expressly recognized the fact
that a no-strike obligation is the employer's quid pro quo for
an undertaking by him to submit grievance disputes to arbitra-
tion. Hence, "[a]ny incentive for employers to enter into such
an agreement is necessarily dissipated if the principal and most
expeditious method by which the no-strike obligation can be
enforced is eliminated."21 Furthermore, "while it is true that
other avenues of redress, such as an action for damages, would
remain open to an aggrieved employer, an award of damages
after a dispute is settled is no substitute for an immediate halt
to an illegal strike.""2 Thus, Boys Markets simply sought to
enforce the bargain struck by the parties.23
Moreover, there is little justification for applying the
Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction provisions to this factual
context. Historically, unions were viewed as criminal conspira-
cies and federal courts freely granted injunctions at the behest
of employers to stem this tide of criminality." However, by
1932 the mood of the nation had changed. The Norris-La Guar-
dia Act was Congress' response to this widespread misuse of the
injunctive remedy in preventing the growth of the American
trade union movement. Today, the growth and vitality of un-
ions is not something which needs such drastic protection. In
fact, the Boys Markets Court expressly recognized that the
21. Id. at 248.
22. Id.
23. "We deal only with the situation in which a collective-bargaining contract
contains a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure." Id. at 253.
The Court adopted the following principles for the guidance of the district courts
in determining whether to grant injunctive relief:
A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not grant injunc-
tive relief against concerted activity unless and until it decides that the
case is one in which an injunction would be appropriate despite the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. When a strike is sought to be enjoined because it
is over a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbi-
trate, the District Court may issue no injunctive order until it first holds
that the contract does have that effect; and the employer should be
ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining an injunction against
the strike. Beyond this, the District Court must, of course, consider
whether issuance of an injunction would be warranted under ordinary
principles of equity-whether breaches are occurring and will continue,
or have been threatened and will be committed; whether they have
caused or will cause irreparable injury to the employer; and whether the
employer will suffer more from the denial of an injunction than will the
union from its issuance.
Id. at 254, quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962) (dissent-
ing opinion).
24. See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1-25 (C.J. Morris ed. 1971).
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status of labor unions at the time Norris-LaGuardia was en-
acted was quite different from the status of labor unions
today." Thus, notwithstanding the original policy which moti-
vated the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a strict appli-
cation of its injunctive prohibitions in this context would frus-
trate the arbitration process and have little utility.
While Boys Markets did settle the question of whether
injunctive relief was ever available in the labor context, it left
unresolved the question of whether the presumption of arbitra-
bility should be applied in determining whether a grievance
was arbitrable for the purpose of issuing a so-called Boys
Markets injunction. The Supreme Court spoke to this issue in
Gateway Coal v. United Mineworkers.2" The Gateway Court
went even further than Boys Markets.27 There the Court held
that in the absence of an express exclusion, disputes were pre-
sumed to have been included in the party's agreed upon arbi-
25. 398 U.S. at 251. As the Court stated:
In 1932, Congress attempted to bring some order out of the industrial
chaos that had developed and to correct the abuses that had resulted
from the interjection of the federal judiciary into union-management
disputes on behalf of management. See declaration of public policy,
Norris-LaGuardia Act, Section 2, 47 Stat. 70 ....
As labor organizations grew in strength and developed towards matu-
rity, congressional emphasis shifted from protection of the nascent labor
movement to the encouragement of collective bargaining and to adminis-
trative techniques for the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes. This
shift in emphasis was accomplished, however, without extensive revision
of many of the older enactments, including the anti-injunctive section of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Id. Considered in this perspective, the Supreme Court's reversal of its earlier Sinclair
decision in Boys Markets was hardly surprising. Sinclair addressed itself to a situation
totally different from that which exists today. Id. at 250-51. It was now possible to
accommodate the principles of the Norris-LaGuardia Act with the emerging federal
common law being developed under section 301.
Sinclair was viewed by the Boys Markets Court as "seriously undermin[ing] the
effectiveness of the arbitration technique as a [peaceful method] to resolve industrial
disputes without resort to strikes, lockouts, and similar devices." Id. at 254. As the
Third Circuit noted in Avco v. Local 287, 459 F.2d 968, 971 (3d Cir. 1972), the decision
in Boys Markets was evidence of the fact that the "policy in favor of enforcing settle-
ment of labor disputes through compulsory arbitration emerged dominant."
26. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
27. Gateway Coal extended Boys Markets to an injunction enforcing an implied
no-strike clause coextensive with the arbitration clause where the question of arbitra-
bility was itself a "substantial question of contractual interpretation." As the Court
later explained, Gateway Coal did not alter the fundamental preconditions of a Boys
Markets injunction: a contractual commitment to final and binding arbitration, a
corresponding commitment to final and binding arbitration, a corresponding no-strike
commitment, and satisfaction of the ordinary principles of equity. See Buffalo Forge
Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3155 n.15 (1976).
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tration procedures and hence were subject to arbitration under
the principles of the Steelworkers Trilogy."8 Further, a Boys
Markets injunction was proper even in the absence of a con-
tractual no-strike clause."9 Since Gateway Coal was a unani-
mous decision, it represented the Court's clear support for
awarding injunctive relief where a contract fails to specifically
address itself to whether or not a particular dispute is arbitra-
ble. Moreover, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that
even a dispute over the scope of an exception to a no-strike
clause, in and of itself, was arbitable. This broad analysis of
arbitration necessarily supports Boys Markets injunctive relief
for sympathy strike situations.
Boys MARKETS IN THE SYMPATHY STRIKE CONTEXT
Conflict in the Circuits
Subsequent to Boys Markets, federal courts were faced
with the problem of having to interpret that decision in the
context of a sympathy strike. Although the Court's broad affir-
mation of Boys Markets in Gateway Coal was significant in
analyzing the sympathy strike situation, federal courts had
diverse views as to its applicability.
One line of circuit court cases followed the proposition that
the honoring of another union's picket line was not enjoinable
since the strike was not "over a grievance." This reasoning was
utilized by the Fifth Circuit in Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-
CIO. 30
28. In Gateway, the contract granted the local mine safety committee authority
to close down and remove workers from dangerous work areas. It was the union's
position that this provision reserved for them the right to strike over safety disputes
and was an express exception to any implied no-strike clause which may have existed
due to the grievance mechanism. The Supreme Court held that the union did not
properly invoke this contractual provision. Whether the union had properly invoked
that provision was held to be a substantial question of contractual interpretation. And,
the collective bargaining agreement explicitly committed to resolution by arbitration
all disagreements as to the meaning and application of that agreement. 414 U.S. at
379-80.
29. Id. at 381-82. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon its earlier
decision in Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 (1962), where it had held that an implied
no-strike clause, coterminous with the parties' commitment to arbitrate, would sup-
port injunctive relief. Thus, to the extent that a dispute is covered under the agree-
ment's mandatory grievance procedure, there exists an obligation to submit the dis-
pute to that procedure as opposed to striking. To the extent that a dispute is arbitrable,
there exists an (implied) obligation to refrain from striking over that dispute.
30. 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972).
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In Amstar, the court refused to provide the employer with
Boys Markets injunctive relief because in its view the Supreme
Court's intent was to create a very narrow exception to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act." The Amstar court found that there
were three prerequisites to a federal court's jurisdiction to en-
join a strike by a labor union. First, the strike must have been
in breach of a no-strike obligation under an effective collective
bargaining agreement. Second, the strike must have been over
an arbitrable grievance. Third, the parties must have been
contractually bound to arbitrate the underlying grievance
which caused the strike. The Amstar court reasoned that a
sympathy strike was not over a grievance which the parties
were contractually bound to arbitrate; therefore, the district
court lacked juridsiction to enjoin the strike.3" The Fifth Circuit
interpreted Boys Markets to require a finding that the strike
was directly caused by a grievance which the striking union
had with the company.33 Thus, according to Amstar, the pro-
priety of employees' participation in a sympathy strike was
not, in and of itself, a grievance which the parties were contrac-
tually bound to arbitrate. Given this determination, the sym-
pathy strike was in no way prohibited by the implication of a
no-strike clause.3 4
Monongahela Power Co. v. Local No. 232, IBEW 5 repre-
sents the split in authority. In Monongahela, the Fourth Cir-
cuit was presented with a situation virtually identical to that
confronted by the Fifth Circuit in Amstar and held that sympa-
thy strikes could be enjoined under Boys Markets if there ex-
isted between the parties a valid collective bargaining agree-
ment which contained a broad grievance procedure." In ad-
dressing the issue of whether injunctive relief was appropriate,
the Fourth Circuit first noted that in Boys Markets cases, the
court must follow the presumption that all disputes were ar-
31. Id. at 1373.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1374. Implicit in the Fifth Circuit's opinion was its fear that granting
injunctive relief in the sympathy strike situation would expand Boys Markets beyond
the "narrow exception" which it felt the Supreme Court intended. Indeed, the court
noted that if injunctive relief were granted in the context of a sympathy strike it would
be difficult to ascertain when such relief would be unavailable.
35. 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973).
36. Id. at 1209. The court utilized the rationale of Teamsters v. Lucas.Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95 (1962). See note 29 supra. The thrust of this line of cases was that the
propriety of the sympathy strike, in and of itself, was an arbitrable issue.
19771
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bitrable unless the private parties have expressly excluded the
matter.37 Finding no such exclusion, the court held that
"disputes as to whether the refusal to cross the picket line and
the resulting work stoppage violated Article X [the no-strike
clause] were clearly subject to mandatory adjustment under
Article IX [the arbitration clause]." 3
Monongahela and its progeny"9 disputed the narrow scope
given to Boys Markets in the Amstar cases.'" Under
Monongahela, the propriety of the sympathy strike, in and of
itself, was an arbitrable issue. The test of arbitrability used in
Monongahela was one of express exclusion, not inclusion. Any
dispute over the legality or propriety of a refusal to cross a
picket line under a collective bargaining agreement was held to
be arbitrable unless such a dispute was specifically excluded
from arbitration. Moreover, even where an item had been ex-
plicitly excluded, the parties were nevertheless required to re-
sort to arbitration to determine whether the action in question
did in fact come with that express exclusion.
The Buffalo Forge Decision
It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court de-
cided Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America.'
By its precise holding, Buffalo Forge says that employers may
appropriately invoke the arbitration process for a determina-
tion of the legality of the sympathy action under the existing
agreement and may compel arbitration where the union refuses
to participate.42 Further, following an arbitral determination
37. 484 F.2d at 1213-14.
38. Id. at 1214.
39. Napa, Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Chauffeurs Local 926, 520 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1975);
Island Creek Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers, 507 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1975); Inland Steel
Co. v. United Mineworkers, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Airline Pilot's Ass'n, 325 F. Supp. 994 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd 442 F.2d 446, reversal
aff'd on rehearing, 442 F.2d 251 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
Several other federal courts have enjoined sympathy strikes pending arbitration.
See, e.g., Pilot Freight Carriers v. Teamsters Local 391, 497 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1974);
Wilmington Shipping Co. v. Longshoremen, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846 (4th Cir. 1974).
40. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union, 520 F.2d
1220 (6th Cir. 1975); Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir.
1975). In addition to the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit's decisions, several federal
district courts have also held that injunctive relief in the sympathy strike context was
inappropriate. Among them are Carnation Co. v. Teamsters, 86 L.R.R.M. 3012 (S.D.
Tex. 1974) and General Cable v. IBEW, 331 F. Supp. 478 (D. Md. 1971).
41. 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
42. Id. at 3150.
674 [Vol. 17
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that the strike was illegal, the employer is entitled to an injunc-
tion to enforce that decision. 3 Pending arbitration, however,
the employer and the public are forced to endure the economic
consequences of a strike.
The majority's rationale. Relying first on section four of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Buffalo Forge Court reaffirmed
its holding in Boys Markets;" federal courts are without juris-
diction to enjoin a strike which is not "over an arbitrable griev-
ance" because doing so would extend Boys Markets beyond the
narrow exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act which it was
meant to create. 5 The Court then found that the parties were
bound by a contract containing a no-strike clause 6 and an
arbitration clause 7 "broad enough to reach not only the dis-
putes between the union and employer about other provisions
in the contract, but also as to the meaning and application of
43. The question arises, however, whether an arbitral determination that an
existing sympathy strike violates the collective bargaining agreement would be res
judicata on that issue or whether a subsequent arbitral determination would be re-
quired to determine the permissibility of each sympathy action taken by the signatory
to the contract. On the precedental value of prior arbitration awards, see generally
ELoum & ELKou, supra note 3, at 251-65.
44. 96 S. Ct. at 3147.
45. Id.
46. Section 14.b of the agreement provided:
There shall be no strikes, work stoppages or interruption or impeding of
work. No Officers or representatives of the Union shall authorize, insti-
gate, aid or condone any such activities. No employee shall participate
in any such activity. The Union recognizes its possible liabilities for viola-
tion of this provision and will use its influence to see that work stoppages
are prevented. Unsuccessful efforts by Union officers or Union representa-
tives to prevent and terminate conduct prohibited by this paragraph, will
not be construed as "aid" or "condonation" of such conduct and shall not
result in any disciplinary actions against the Officers, committeemen or
stewards involved.
Id. at 3143 n.1.
47. The relevant grievance and arbitration procedure before the Court provided:
26. Should differences arise between the [employer] and any employee
covered by this Agreement as to the meaning and application of the
provisions of this Agreement, or should any trouble of any kind arise in
the plant, there shall be no suspension of work on account of such differ-
ences, but an earnest effort shall be made to settle such differences
immediately [under the six-step grievance and arbitration procedure
provided in sections 27 through 32].
The final step in the six-part grievance procedure is provided for in section 32:
In the event the grievance involves a question as to the meaning and
application of the provisions of this Agreement, and has not been pre-
viously satisfactorily adjusted, it may be submitted to arbitration upon
written notice of the Union or the Company.
Id. at 3143-44 & n.2.
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the no-strike clause itself."48 Thus, the Court ruled that the
propriety of the sympathy strike was an arbitrable issue under
the existing agreement over which the employer was entitled
to compel arbitration."
It was at this point in the decision, however, that the Court
departed from the logic which had heretofore compelled it to
issue injunctions in Boys Markets and Gateway Coal. Although
the Court reaffirmed its earlier Boys Markets holding in toto,
it clearly disclaimed that decision's applicability in the sympa-
thy strike context. The Court hinged its analysis on language
in Boys Markets requiring, as a precondition to granting in-
junctive relief, that the strike be "over a grievance" which both
parties were bound to arbitrate. Despite its previous statement
that the strike was an arbitrable issue, the Court made the
determination that the sympathy strike was not within the
contemplation of the grievance and arbitration procedure to
which the employer had bound itself in exchange for the
union's no-strike pledge. 0 Instead, the majority characterized
the sympathy strike as having "neither the purpose nor the
effect of denying or evading an obligation to arbitrate or of
depriving the employer of his bargain."'" Furthermore, the
Court concluded that "to the extent that courts of appeals and
other courts have assumed that a mandatory arbitration clause
implies a commitment not to engage in sympathy strikes, they
are wrong."" Nor, noted the Court, was an injunction author-
ized solely because it was alleged that the sympathy strike
called by the union violated the express no-strike provision of
the contract.53
The Court expressed its fear that federal courts would be-
come embroiled in massive preliminary injunction litigation,
not only for the purpose of enforcing promises to arbitrate,
which was the limit of Boys Markets, but also for the purpose
of preliminarily dealing with the merits of the factual and legal
issues that were subjects for the arbitrator and of issuing in-
48. Id. at 3148.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 3147.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 3147 n.10.
53. Authorization of injunctive power would extend Boys Markets beyond the
narrow exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act which it was meant to create and put
the Court in a position expressly antagonistic to the congressional intent evinced by
the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Id. at 3147.
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junctions that would otherwise be forbidden by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.54
Defects in the majority's rationale. While Justice White's
characterization of the sympathy strike may be appealing, it
is not compelling. The Court's denial of injunctive relief was
entirely inconsistent both with their factual conclusion that the
propriety of the sympathy strike was an arbitrable issue under
the contract in question, and with the federal labor policy of
promoting arbitration, a policy the Court reiterated throughout
its opinion.55
In a stinging dissent, Justice Stevens accused the majority
of holding "only part of the union's quid pro quo enforceable
by injunction."56 The dissent quickly disposed of the majority's
judicial economy argument as being "wholly unrealistic."57
54. If an injunction could issue against the strike in this case, so in
proper circumstances could a court enjoin any other alleged breach of
contract pending the exhaustion of the applicable grievance and arbitra-
tion provisions even though the injunction would otherwise violate one of
the express prohibitions of § 104 . . . . This would cut deeply into the
policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and make the courts potential partici-
pants in a wide range of arbitrable disputes under the many existing and
future collective bargaining contracts, not just for the purpose of enforc-
ing promises to arbitrate, which was the limit of Boys Markets, but for
the purpose of preliminarily dealing with the merits of the factual and
legal issues that are subjects for the arbitrator and of issuing injunctions
that would otherwise be forbidden by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Id. at 3148-49.
55. The majority recognized:
The driving force behind Boys Markets was to implement the strong
congressional preference for the private dispute settlement mechanisms
agreed upon by the parties. . . . Striking over an arbitrable dispute
would interfere with and frustrate the arbitral processes by which the
parties had chosen to settle a dispute. The quid pro quo for the employer's
promise to arbitrate was the union's obligation not to strike over issues
that were subject to the arbitration machinery. Even in the absence of
an express no-strike clause, an undertaking not to strike would be implied
where the strike was over an otherwise arbitrable dispute. . . . Other-
wise, the employer would be deprived of his bargain and the policy of the
labor statutes to implement private resolution of disputes in a manner
agreed upon would seriously suffer.
Id. at 3147.
It concluded that "[cloncededly, that issue was arbitrable [and] the employer
was entitled to an order requiring the Union to arbitrate if it refused to do so." Id. at
3148.
56. Id. at 3150 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 3150. The majority's expressed concern was that enforcing an unambi-
guous no-strike clause by enjoining a sympathy strike might embroil the district courts
in massive preliminary injunction litigation. Id. at 3149 n.12. Justice Stevens replied:
[This concern] is supposedly supported by the fact that 21 million
American workers were covered by over 150,000 collective bargaining
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Then, Justice Stevens cited several reasons why the majority's
focus upon the "over a grievance" language from Boys Markets
was inapposite. His analysis convincingly establishes that Boys
Markets injunctions could be appropriate in the sympathy
strike context.
First, injunctions enforcing a contractual commitment to
arbitrate a dispute were not among the abuses against which
the Norris-LaGuardia Act was aimed.58 It was clear from the
declaration of policy in the Norris-LaGuardia Act itself that it
was the history of injunctions against strike activity in further-
ance of union organization that led to its enactment in 1932.11
According to the dissent, it is equally clear that injunctions in
the sympathy strike context do not compromise the central
concerns of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Such injunctions con-
cern only the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements
and not the process by which such agreements were negoti-
ated."
Second, the enactment of section 301(a) of the LMRA,
enlarging the jurisdiction of federal courts to grant relief in
labor disputes, was viewed by the Boys Markets Court as evinc-
ing a strong public policy which favored the enforceability of
labor agreements.6" "[T]he same public interest in an enforce-
agreements in 1972. These figures give some idea of the potential number
of grievances that may arise, each of which could lead to a strike which
is plainly enjoinable under Boys Markets. These figures do not shed any
light on the number of sympathy strikes which may violate an express
no-strike commitment. In the past several years over a dozen such cases
have arisen.
Id. at 3150 n.3.
58. Justice Stevens noted:
Referring to the holding in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 [(1957)] ... the [Boys Markets] Court stated that it had
"rejected the contention that the anti-injunction proscriptions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited this type of relief, noting that a refusal
to arbitrate was not 'part and parcel of the abuses against which the Act
was aimed' . . . and that the Act itself manifests a policy determination
that arbitration should be encouraged."
Id. at 3151 n.5.
59. As the Court observed in Boys Markets, the climate of labor
relations has been transformed since the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act .... "[T]he central purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to foster
the growth and viability of labor organizations is hardly retarded-if
anything, this goal is advanced-by a remedial device that merely en-
forces the obligation that the union freely undertook under a specifically
enforceable agreement to submit disputes to arbitration."
Id. at 3151-52.
60. Id. at 3152.
61. With specific reference to the value of an enforceable commit-
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able quid pro quo [was] present here [in the sympathy strike
context] as in Boys Markets," noted Justice Stevens. 2 Hence,
it was "simply wrong to argue," as the Court did, "that the
strike in this case could not have had the purpose or the effect
of depriving the employer of his bargain."63
Next, the literal wording of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
not an insuperable obstacle to specific enforcement of a no-
strike commitment. 4 The Boys Markets Court itself relied
upon a line of cases in which the language of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act had not been given controlling effect, and
which held that federal courts could issue injunctions in labor
disputes to compel fulfillment of the party's Railway Labor
Act 65 obligations. Quoting from Brotherhood of Railway Train-
men v. Chicago River & Indiana Railroad Co.,"6 Justice Stevens
noted that in that case the Court held the Norris-LaGuardia
Act not to be a bar to injunctive relief because of the "need to
accommodate two statutes, when both were adopted as part of
a pattern of labor legislation."67 In Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills,"5 the Court relied upon the same rationale to hold that
ment to arbitrate grievance disputes, Boys Markets emphasized the im-
portance of the union's no-strike commitment as the quid pro quo for the
employer's undertaking to submit disputes to arbitration.
Id. See discussion of Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, note 3 supra.
Justice Stevens also took note of the practical reality that in many collective
bargaining agreements the employer agreed to a mandatory arbitration clause only in
exchange for a no-strike clause that extended beyond strikes over arbitrable disputes.
96 S. Ct. at 3152. See Feller, A General Theory of Collective Bargaining Agreements,
61 CALIF. L. REv. 653, 657-66 (1966). In light of this fact the dissent also noted that
[ainy incentive for employers to enter into such agreement is necessarily
dissipated if the principal and most expeditious method by which the no-
strike obligation can be enforced is eliminated. While it is of course true,
as respondent contends, that other avenues of redress, such as an action
for damages, would remain open to an aggrieved employer, an award of
damages after a dispute has been settled is no substitute for an immedi-
ate halt to an illegal strike. Furthermore, an action for damages prose-
cuted during or after a labor dispute would only tend to aggravate in-
dustrial strife and delay an early resolution of the difficulties between
employer and union.
96 S. Ct. at 3152, n.8.
62. 96 S. Ct. at 3152-53.
63. Id. at 3153. Justice Stevens cautioned, however, that "this portion of the
rationale of Boys Markets applies only to the extent of the certainty that the sympathy
strike falls within the no-strike clause." Id.
64. Id.
65. 44 Stat. 577 (1927), as amended, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934) (current version at 45
U.S.C. § 151-188 (1970)).
66. 353 U.S. 30, 39-42 (1956).
67. 96 S. Ct. at 3153.
68. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See note 10 supra.
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section 301(a) of the LMRA conferred jurisdiction upon the
district courts to grant the union specific enforcement of their
agreed upon arbitration clause.
Fourth, not only did Boys Markets emphasize a strong
federal policy favoring the settlement of labor disputes, but
also it expressed a policy preference for the settlement of labor
disputes by arbitration. Since this method of dispute settle-
ment is available only by agreement between the parties, this
pro-arbitration policy equally favors the making of enforceable
agreements to arbitrate."
Thus, concluded Justice Stevens, the thrust of Boys
Markets was to protect the integrity of the arbitration process.
Therefore, a court faced with a breach of a no-strike clause
should be empowered to enjoin that strike if it concerned an
arbitrable issue under the contract. 70
The minority then addressed what it perceived to be the
union's fears in being subjected to a Boys Markets injunction
in the sympathy strike context. The union advanced concern
that interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement was
in the exclusive province of the arbitrator and that courts were
without the necessary expertise to properly interpret those
agreements. To this argument the dissent responded that "an
interim court determination of the no-strike question by the
court neither usurps nor precludes a decision by the arbitra-
tor. ' ' 7' Issuance of an injunction pending arbitration does not
supplant the decision that the arbitrator otherwise would have
made.
Another of the union's concerns was that erroneously en-joining a sympathy strike pending arbitration would effectively
deprive union members of their right to strike before an arbi-
trator could render his decision. While the dissent was sympa-
thetic to this concern, the minority noted that denial of an
69. A sympathy strike in violation of a no-strike clause does not
directly frustrate the arbitration process, but if the clause is not enforcea-
ble against such a strike, it does frustrate the more basic policy of moti-
vating employers to agree to binding arbitration by giving them an effec-
tive "assurance of uninterrupted operation during the term of the agree-
ment."
96 S. Ct. at 3155 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 3155. However, the court's power is limited by the contours of the
agreement between the parties. In this case, the question of whether a sympathy strike
violates the no-strike clause was found by the majority to be an arbitrable issue. See
notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra.
71. 96 S. Ct. at 3157.
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injunction where it was appropriate had an equally devastating
economic effect on the employer. 2 Furthermore, since a sympa-
thy strike does not directly further the economic interests of the
members of the striking local, but rather is a new dispute which
will impose costs on the strikers, the employer and the public,
it is in the public's interest to be assured that the strike was
permitted by the parties' agreement."
Finally, the union contended that granting an injunction
pending resolution by an arbitrator was antagonistic to the
implicit policy in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of eliminating the
risk of injunctions for lawful strikes. The dissent found this
argument devoid of any merit.74 Boys Markets itself subjected
the union to the risk of an injunction entered upon a judge's
erroneous conclusion that the dispute was arbitrable and that
the strike was in violation of the no-strike clause. Furthermore,
Gateway Coal subjected the union to still a greater risk by
approving an injunction to enforce an implied no-strike obliga-
tion.
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Prior to Buffalo Forge an employer could be reasonably
assured that a no-strike pledge meant the union would refrain
from resorting to strike activity under any circumstances (or be
enjoined). This is certainly no longer true. By qualifying the
meaning of the union's no-strike obligation, the Court neces-
sarily weakened the integrity of the agreements reached be-
tween union and management. Now the parameters of a
union's no-strike obligation are left to the union's discretion
because it is free to decide whether its members shall honor
another union's picket line. And, where a union does decide to
participate in the strike, then, notwithstanding its express no-
strike pledge, its action is protected pending arbitration.
Undoubtedly, unions are fully aware of their new found
power. This situation places an employer who is attempting to
negotiate a contract in a substantially weaker bargaining posi-
tion. In an attempt to unqualify the no-strike pledge, an em-
ployer will now insist upon a clause which clearly indicates
either that sympathy strikes are per se violations of the con-
tract or that such disputes will be subject to a summary arbi-
72. Id.
73. Id. at 3157-58.
74. Id. at 3158.
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tration procedure. However, since sympathy strikes are pro-
tected activity under section 7 of the LMRA and now are not
subject to the injunctive sanction, only the weakest unions will
expressly waive this right. Necessarily, agreements will be
more difficult to reach.
Moreover, an employer's desire to commit resolution of all
industrial disputes to the arbitration process may be greatly
reduced" in that the newly qualified no-strike obligation which
he receives is less reliable. Thus, the employer may have to
endure a strike without adequate remedial relief. The result
may be an exacerbation of an already difficult negotiation pro-
cess and heightened labor strife.
Buffalo Forge ignored the reality that a sympathy strike is
nonetheless a strike. As such, it is a union's most potent eco-
nomic weapon. Organized labor may now freely utilize this
weapon without apprehension that its motives will be scruti-
nized. As long as the striking union contends that its work
stoppage was motivated by some force outside the employment
relationship, it will proceed judicially uninhibited. This result
runs contra to the Supreme Court's pronounced preference for
arbitration."7
More significantly, injunctive relief in the sympathy strike
context gives rise to none of the abuses Norris-LaGuardia was
intended to prevent. Requiring a union to channel a dispute
through the grievance arbitration procedure, rather than
through self help, is entirely consistent not only with the
union's contractual commitments, but with the Norris-La-
Guardia Act as well. As the minority vividly evinced, the result
which the majority reached is clearly antagonistic to the
policies reflected in the Boys Markets and Gateway Coal cases
and tends only to belittle the credibility of both the bargaining
75. See note 6 supra.
76. In a sympathy strike, an arbitrator can resolve the dispute by determining
whether or not the union's members have a right, under the collective bargaining
agreement to honor the picket line. Drake Bakeries v. Local 50, American Bakery &
Confectionery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1952); RTT World Communications, Inc. v.
Communications Workers of America, 422 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1970). This area is not new
to arbitrators, and the National Labor Relations Board has recognized this fact by
referring a case to arbitration where the issue was whether or not the employees had a
right to honor picket lines. Gray-Hobart Water Co. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.
1975). As such, this type of dispute, in the Supreme Court's words, "is grist in the mills
of the arbitrators." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 584 (1960). See also Jones, Power and Prudence in the Arbitration of Labor
Disputes: A Venture in Some Hypotheses, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 675, 780 (1964).
[Vol. 17
BUFFALO FORGE
process as a whole and the agreement which the parties ulti-
mately reach."
CONCLUSION
Boys Markets unequivocally chose arbitration in accord-
ance with the parties' contract as the terminal point for con-
tractual disputes. Any union which voluntarily bound itself
and its members to a no-strike clause and a mandatory griev-
ance arbitration procedure must be prevented from bypassing
those commitments. Even where there is a negotiated picket
line clause in the contract, that exception to arbitrability is
still, in and of itself, an arbitrable issue under Gateway Coal.
The Buffalo Forge Court's refusal to grant an injunction
pending arbitration can only exacerbate existing labor-
management strife. Destroying the symmetry of obligation cre-
ated eariler can only provide employers with less motivation to
negotiate grievance arbitration procedures since they know
that the no-strike pledge they receive from the union is quali-
fied by the holding in Buffalo Forge. The obvious result is that
agreements will become more difficult to reach and both sides
may be motivated to resort to economic weapons in an attempt
to achieve a satisfactory agreement. Thus, Buffalo Forge will
burden not only employers, but also the public which must
endure the hardship and inconvenience of every strike.
Richard Steven Rosenberg
77. Since the central purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to foster the
growth and vitality of labor organizations, this goal can be advanced by a remedial
device which enforces the obligations which a union freely undertook.
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